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A New Approach to Data Security Breaches
Gideon Emcee Christian*
INTRODUCTION
Identity theft, or fraud, has become a serious cause for concern in the informa-
tion technology world. It is quickly gaining notoriety as one of the fastest growing
crimes, and its growth has been attributed to the ever-increasing rate of data secur-
ity breaches, which have continued to dominate the news as well as the courts.1
The judiciary and the legislature, in various legal jurisdictions, have made several
efforts to deal with the ever-increasing cases of data security breaches. In the case
of the judiciary, it has sought (with great difficulty) to stretch or over-stretch ex-
isting laws, which have been formulated when the information technology world
had not been conceived. The legislature, on the other hand, has been more con-
cerned with formulating new laws to comprehensively deal with the situation.
This article examines the problems associated with data security breaches
from two different, but not mutually exclusive, perspectives. The first part of the
article examines the need for notification in the event of a data security breach and
proposes an amendment of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Document Act2 (PIPEDA) to create a legal, or statutory, obligation in Canada to
compel disclosure or notification of data security breaches. My recommendations
are based on the examination of legislation from other legal jurisdictions, highlight-
ing, where necessary, the shortcomings of the legislation, which ought to be taken
into consideration in amending PIPEDA or in drafting a model data security breach
notification legislation in Canada.
The second part of the article examines the resort to the common law tort of
negligence by victims of data security breaches in seeking legal remedy from indi-
viduals or organizations whose negligent act(s) resulted in a data spill. While ac-
knowledging that data security breach is a new phenomenon, not yet adequately
addressed in common law, I shall go further to show the difficulty in attempts to
redress much of the legal claims that come with data security breaches in common
law.
* LL.M (Law and Technology), Researcher, International Development Research Centre
(IDRC). gchristian@ldrc.ca. The author is grateful to Prof. Jennifer Chandler for
supervising this research, and to Mr. Isa Alade for taking time to proof read the original
draft.
1 Amanda Draper, “Identity Theft: Plugging the Massive Data Leaks with a Stricter Na-
tionwide Breach-Notification Law” (2007) 40 John Marshall Law Review 681 at 685.
2 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5.
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I. A NEW APPROACH TO DATA SECURITY BREACH
NOTIFICATION
The year 2005 witnessed an unprecedented number of disclosures of data se-
curity breaches.3 In the United States, there were approximately 130 reported cases
of data security breaches that year, involving the personal information of more than
55 million individuals.4 A superficial look at these statistics will tend to give the
deceptive impression that there were no serious cases of data security breaches
before then. However, many such incidents, which occurred prior to 2005, went
undisclosed due to the absence of any legal obligation on the part of data brokers or
custodians to disclose their data “spill.” Such incidents were surreptitiously
shielded from the public, as well as the victims, whose personal information was
spilled, leaving the latter at the risk of identity theft and fraud.
A new California state law prompted the turning point in 2005. It imposed an
obligation on a person, business, or state agency that conducts business in the state
of California and that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal
information, to disclose any breach of the security of the data of any resident of
California, whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed
to have been acquired by an unauthorized person.5 A leading case of data security
breach that was disclosed because of this legislation was the notorious Choicepoint
security breach in the United States in 2005.6
One may wonder why a legislative intervention is necessary to impose an obli-
gation on data possessors or custodians to disclose incidents of data security
breaches. This query finds response in the fact that, in the absence of such legal
obligation, organizations, data brokers and corporate entities have no incentive to
voluntarily disclose such security breaches. If the market gives companies the req-
uisite incentives to notify their clients that personal information has been breached,
so that they can take the necessary steps to mitigate damage or risks that may arise
from the misappropriation of their personal information, legislative intervention
might not be necessary. However, this is not the case.
There are many reasons why an organization or corporate body, in the absence
of any legal obligation to the contrary, will prefer not to disclose its data security
breaches. First, such notification could have an adverse effect on the company’s
reputation and business, especially where the company trades in a very competitive
3 An updated chronology of data security breaches in the United States can be found
online: Privacy Right Clearing House <http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/
chrondatabreaches.htm>.
4 See David G. Ries, “Information Security Law An Overview” ISACA (February 2007),
online: ISACA <http://www.isacapgh.org/SecurityLaw.pdf>.
5 S.B. 1386, codified at California Civil Code ss. 1798.29, 1798.82, online: California
State Senate <http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/
sb_1386_bill_20020926_chaptered.html>.
6 The data broker singled out only residents of California for notification despite the fact
that more than 100,000 other people in the United States were affected by the breach.
A NEW APPROACH TO DATA SECURITY BREACHES   151
market or is a public company.7 In addition to being embarrassing, notification or
disclosure will also send an ugly message to the public, conveying the company’s
lack of adequate security for its clients’ personal information, thus affecting the
company’s future business.8 The latter case applies to companies whose business
model involves the collection of their customers’ personal information as opposed
to that of data brokers.
Secondly, security breach notification or disclosure could open a floodgate of
civil litigation (individual or class) against the company. In addition, depending on
the legal jurisdiction, the Attorney-General could also bring an enforcement ac-
tion.9 The financial costs from this myriad of litigations might as well far exceed
the cost of non-disclosure from the company’s perspective, thus providing adequate
incentive for the company to lean on the side of non-disclosure in the absence of
any legal obligation to the contrary.10
7 In 2005, a poll by Ponemon Institute revealed that one in five Americans surveyed
immediately terminated their business with organizations that lost their personal infor-
mation. Another 40% of the respondents polled by the organization’s National Survey
on Data Security Breach Notification considered taking their business to some other
organization following their receipt of data breach notifications. See Ponemon Institute
LLC, Survey, “National Survey on Data Security Breach Notification” (26 September
2005), online: RSA Conference <http://www.rsaconference.com/uploadedFiles/
RSA365/ESAF/2006_Archives/Sept2005_Security_Breach_Survey_Ponemon.pdf>.
ChoicePoint, for example, at a particular point in time, experienced more than a 20 per
cent decline in its stock price that followed its February 2005 disclosure of a serious
security breach. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, “The Challenge of Electronic Data: Cor-
porate Legal Obligations to Provide Information Security” (2006) 10:3 Wall Street
Lawyer 1 at 6, online: Baker&McKenzie
<http://www.bakernet.com/ecommerce/wallstreetlawyerarticle.pdf>.
8 The annual Computer Security Institute and FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
for 2005 reported that only 20 per cent of respondents who suffered serious computer
security breaches reported the incident to law enforcement. According to the survey,
the key reason companies do not report intrusions to law enforcement is the concern for
negative publicity. See full report, online: i.cmpnet.com
<http://i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/db_area/pdfs/fbi/FBI2005.pdf>.
9 Political & Economic Research Council, Michael Turner, “Towards a Rational Per-
sonal Data Breach Notification Regime” Information Policy Institute (June 2006) at 14,
online: Political&Economic Research Council <http://www.infopolicy.org/pdf/data-
breach.pdf>.
10 In the case of ChoicePoint, earlier mentioned, the company, in addition to being sued
by its customers, was fined US$10 million and US$5million for civil penalties and
consumer redress respectively, by the Federal Trade Commission. See U.S., Federal
Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10
Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (FTC File No. 052-3069)
(26 January 2006), online: Federal Trade Commission
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm>.
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It suffices to reiterate that data brokers and custodians, whether government,
business, etc., apparently have no incentive to disclose incidents of data security
breaches in the absence of any legal obligation. Resultantly, there arises the need
for legal intervention in this area because, when an incident of data security breach
is concealed, affected individuals are exposed to risks, of which they are com-
pletely unaware and, more so, have no reasonable opportunity to remedy the situa-
tion or take precautionary measures.
The duty to disclose breaches of data security is comparable to the common
law “duty to warn” of dangers. This is premised on the principle that a party with
superior knowledge of a danger of injury or damage to another, which is posed by a
specific hazard, must warn those who lack such knowledge, especially when a spe-
cial relationship exists between the parties. The existing data security breach notifi-
cation statutes have been driven by concerns relating to identity theft and fraud,
thus compelling disclosure of breaches affecting personal information as a way of
protecting individuals who might be at risk without such notification. Schwartz and
Janger identified an important function of data breach notification laws as the miti-
gation of harm after a data leak.11 These statutes seek to provide such individuals
with opportunity to take preventive measures.12 Hence, it has been argued that the
only way to ensure true accountability is to impose a legal obligation on organiza-
tions to disclose their data security breaches.13
On the other hand, critics of security breach notification laws argue that such
legislative efforts seek to impose unnecessary and burdensome costs, in terms of
time and money, on both organizations, as well as clients who may take no neces-
sary steps to protect themselves notwithstanding such notification. They argue that
the chance of breached personal information being misappropriated for identity
theft or fraud is negligible — a one per cent to five per cent chance. Hence, impos-
ing an obligation for disclosure or notification may result in over-notification in
most cases and cause unnecessary alarm on the part of the majority of those
notified.14
Such over-notification will have some negative implications. First, it may
have the tendency to erode the confidence of consumers, not only in the company
or organization, but also in the online transaction system, which has contributed
positively to a vibrant world economy — notwithstanding the fact that such
breaches only account for a negligible share of fraud cases.15 Second, it may result
11 Schwartz and Janger, “Notification and Data Security Breaches” (2007) 105 Michigan
Law Review 913 at 918.
12 Smedinghoff, supra note 7 at 12.
13 See Public Interest Advocacies Centre, Submission to the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics Considering the 2006 Review
of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), (23
October 2006), online: CIPPIC <http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-cases/privacy/
submissions/PIACSubmissiontoETHI.pdf>.
14 Turner, supra note 9 at 28.
15 Ibid. at 30.
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in notification desensitization. Consumers may become so accustomed to receiving
breach notifications that they may ignore them without taking any steps to protect
themselves. This argument seems to find support in a theory by the information
theorist Herbert Simon, who was of the view that the problem associated with be-
ing over-informed, lies in how to allocate our limited attention span to the ever-
expanding sources of information. According to him, attention is a scarce resource
and, in a world of expanding information, more information can be a problem;
rather than an automatic solution to the dilemma of ignorance, information can turn
individuals “off” to important messages that they otherwise would have noticed.16
One of the primary opponents of data security breach notification legislation
in Canada is the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. The Chairman of the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce, in his oral submission to the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics with consideration of the
Review of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act,
noted:
The Canadian Chamber does not believe that mandatory breach notification
is necessary in the legislation. We would encourage businesses to continue
to work closely with the Privacy Commissioner’s office in order to identify
breaches and to notify those who could be affected by a possible breach in
privacy. This flexibility enables notice where appropriate in the circum-
stances, with no adverse impact on consumers. I’d also like to note that it
would be beneficial for the Canadian Chamber and other business associa-
tions to develop a best practices set of guidelines that could be used when
breaches in privacy occur.17
A study finds that the adoption of data breach disclosure laws by some states
in the U.S., between 2002 and 2007, had a marginal effect on the incidence of
identity theft and reduced the rate by just two per cent, on the average. The study
further acknowledges that, notwithstanding the marginal effect, reducing identity
theft is only one means by which data breach disclosure laws can be evaluated. The
laws may have other important benefits, such as reducing the average victim’s
losses or improving a firm’s security and operational practices.18
16 Herbert A. Simon, “Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World” in M.
Greenberger, ed., Computers, Communications, and the Public Interest (Baltimore:
John Hopkins Press, 1971) 38, cited after reprint in: H.A. Simon, Models of Bounded
Rationality, Volume 2: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1982) at 40.
17 See Parliament, “Statutory Review of the Personal Information Protection and Elec-
tronic Document Act (PIPEDA)” by Tom Wappel, M.P. Chairman, Fourth Report of
the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, 39th Parl. 1st
Sess., online: Government of Canada <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/ commit-
tee/391/ethi/reports/rp2891060/ethirp04-e.html>.
18 Sasha Romanosky, Rahul Telang & Alessandro Acquisti, “Do Data Breach Disclosure
Laws Reduce Identity Theft?” (16 September 2008), (SSRN), online: SSRN
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1268926>.
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Some critics of breach notification laws argue that, if for any reason data
breach notification legislation is necessary, such legislation should leave it open to
the discretion of the data broker or organization involved in the breach to determine
if the breach is of such a nature as to warrant disclosure.19 This, they argue, will
check the problems associated with over-notification. This argument seems to find
expression in the data security breaches notification law of the state of Arkansas.20
The legislation provides for exemption for notification “if after a reasonable inves-
tigation the person or the business determines that there is no reasonable likelihood
of harm to customers.”21 There are, however, many reasons to oppose this
approach.
Granted, over-notification could lead to desensitization, but leaving it to the
discretion of data brokers or organizations to determine whether to notify their cli-
ents of a security breach or not, will not be in the best interest of the individual
whose personal information is at risk. The reason for this is that, in the exercise of
such discretion, the organizations involved will tend to put their business interests
or corporate image ahead of the personal interests of the clients. Such a company
will become the judge in its own case, and it is hard to imagine that such discretion
will be exercised judiciously in most cases. As I shall argue later, the discretion to
determine whether a disclosure or notification should be made would be best exer-
cised by a third party who has no personal interest in the matter.
As the number and size of personal information, or data banks, continues to
rise in response to modern business needs, incidents of data security breach will
continue to rise correlatively, along with incidental identity theft and fraud. Unless
an organization notifies individuals that their personal information is at risk, such
individuals may eventually become the unwitting victims of potentially devastating
identity theft and fraud. Whatever argument may be proffered by the anti-notifica-
19 In late April 2008, Canwest News Service reported on a leaked draft review of
PIPEDA. The report reveals that the “federal government is proposing to leave it up to
companies to decide when to tell customers of a loss of personal information and only
in cases where businesses determine there is a ‘high risk of significant harm’ from the
security breach.” The report went further to state that “factors to be considered by com-
panies in determining whether a security breach meets the threshold include the sensi-
tivity of information, nature and number of data elements, whether the information is
unreadable or unusable, probability that the information could be misused for harmful
purposes, and other ‘contextual and situational factors.’” See Sarah Schmidt, “Feds to
Leave Disclosure of Data Security Breaches to Businesses: Legislative Plan” Can-
ada.com (24 April 2008), online: Canada.com <http://www.canada.com/topics/
news/national/story.html?id=b1e17cf1-bbba-46e6-acdc-a9650682d6a9&k=1253>.
20 U.S., Bill S. 1167, 86th General Assembly, Ar. (2005) An Act to Provide Notice
to Consumers of the Disclosure of Their Personal Information, online: Arkan-
sas 86th General Assembly <http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ftproot/
bills/2005/public/SB1167.pdf>.
21 Ibid. at s. 4-110-105(d). See also the position in the State of Kansas, U.S., Bill S. 196,
Kan. (2006) ss. 4(1), 149, online: Kansas Legislature
<http://www.kslegislature.org/bills/2006/196.pdf>.
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tion school of thought, I am of the view that the benefits of well-designed notifica-
tion regimes far outweigh the costs. I shall further analyze existing data security
breach notification statutes in the United States and Canada. In the course of the
analysis, I shall proffer recommendations, where necessary, for a well-designed
data security breach notification law in Canada, taking into consideration the criti-
cisms hitherto highlighted.
(a) An Analysis of Data Security Breach Notification Legislation
(i) United States
Although there is a profusion of data security breach notification statutes in
the United States, none of them seems to be of general application. More than half
of the states have enacted their own data security breach notification legislation. An
attempt to introduce similar legislation at the federal level has remained in a stale-
mate. Hence, what is obtainable in the United States today is a labyrinth of sectoral
and issue-specific state legislation. One cannot but warn of the conflicts of laws
situations probably to arise from such a proliferation of state legislation, especially
considering the ease of data transferability across state boundaries.
(A) Federal Legislation
In 1999, the U.S. Congress introduced the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).
Section 501(b) of the Act mandated each agency or authority mentioned in section
505(a) of the Act22 to establish an appropriate standard for financial institutions
under their jurisdiction “to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
records or information which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to
any customer.”23 The fact that the statute required a regulatory standard that will
prevent the “use” of personal information obtained through such unauthorized ac-
cess could imply, among others, a response program that will ensure notification to
individuals whose personal information has been breached. Such a response pro-
gram is the best way to give the affected individuals the opportunity to take preven-
tive measures to forestall the use of breached personal information.24
22 Such agencies include Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC),
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS) and National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA).
23 Emphasis added. See generally s. 505 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 USCS ss.
6801–6809, et seq. 106 P.L. 102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1999 Enacted S. 900; 106 Enacted S.
900 [GLBA].
24 It could also imply notification to credit card companies, credit monitoring agencies or
other third parties who may be instrumental in forestalling the unauthorized use of such
personal information.
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In response to this mandate, the Federal Financial Institution Examination
Council (FFIEC) agencies25 jointly issued interpretative guidance for financial in-
stitutions.26 The Interagency Guidance, among others, requires financial institu-
tions to “develop and implement a response program designed to address incidents
of unauthorized access to customer information maintained by the financial institu-
tion or its service provider.”27 Such a response program should contain, among
other things, procedures for assessing the nature and scope of an incident, and iden-
tifying what customer information systems and types of customer information has
been accessed or misused. It should also contain procedures for notifying custom-
ers, when warranted, in a manner designed to ensure that customers will be able to
reasonably receive the news.28 Such notification should include, inter alia,
1) a description of the incident,
2) the type of information subject to unauthorized access,
3) measures taken by the institution to protect customers from further unau-
thorized access,
4) a telephone number customers can call for information and assistance,
5) a reminder to the customers to remain vigilant over the next twelve to 24
months and to report suspected identity theft incidents to the institution.29
Although the Interagency Guidance obligates notification for security
breaches when warranted, it suffices to state that it is neither a piece of legislation
nor part of the GLBA. It can be considered as a directive made by a regulatory
body, pursuant to powers conferred on it by law, the breach or non-compliance of
which may result in administrative sanctions by the regulatory body.30
(B) State Legislation
The state of California was the first jurisdiction in the United States to intro-
duce a data security breach notification law. The Bill, which came into effect in
25 GLBA, supra note 23.
26 See “Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Cus-
tomer Information and Customer Notice.” 70:59 Fed, Reg, 15636 (2005).
27 Ibid. at 15737.
28 Customer notification is warranted where the financial institution becomes aware of a
breach of “sensitive customer information”, unless the institution after adequate inves-
tigation, “reasonably concludes that misuse of the information is unlikely to occur”.
Notwithstanding, it must take appropriate steps to protect the interest of the affected
customers including, but not limited to, monitoring the affected customers’ account.
See Interagency Guidance, supra note 26 at 15743.
29Ibid. at 15746.
30 See Guin v. Brazos Higher Education Service Corp. Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4846
(D. Minn., 2006), [Brazos]. Where the court said that GLBA did not impose an obliga-
tion on financial institution to encrypt data.
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July 2003, was incorporated into the California Civil Code31 and applies to govern-
ment agencies32 as well as any person or business33 doing business in California,
irrespective of whether such a person or business resides in, or is based in Califor-
nia. The mere fact that such a person or business carries on business in California,
whether online or offline, brings it within the long arm of the California law.
Therefore, it is suggested that a Canadian merchant, who transacts business with a
Californian resident online, is bound to give notice to the latter in the event of a
data security breach involving his personal information. Curiously, under the cur-
rent state of Canadian law, the merchant is not under any legal obligation to give
the same kind of notice to Canadian residents who transact business with him.
The California law requires notification to be made with regard to any security
breach involving unencrypted personal information. Personal information is de-
fined to mean “an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combina-
tion with any one or more of the following data elements: social security number,
driver’s license number or California Identification Card number, account number,
credit or debit card number in combination with any required security code, access
code, or password that would permit access to an individual’s financial account.”34
Therefore, it logically follows that the requirement for notification under this law
will not apply if the data security breach involves encrypted data.35
The problem with this limitation of notification to unencrypted data lies in the
fact that, with development in information technology, certain levels of encryption,
hitherto considered secure, may subsequently become less secure and hence, lend
themselves to being cracked without much difficulty. What we have today is a con-
tinuous increase in levels of encryption; the higher the level, the more secure the
encrypted data. A data breach with a very low level of encryption will not require
notification under the California law — this notwithstanding the fact that the per-
sonal information stands the risk of being deciphered and misappropriated. In view
of this, the Federal Interagency Guidance, issued under the authority of the GLBA,
rejects blanket exclusion for encrypted information because, “there are many levels
of encryption, some of which do not effectively protect customer information”.36
Considering the dynamic nature of information technology, it is recommended
that comprehensive data security breaches notification legislation should be flexible
31 California Civil Code, supra note 5.
32 Ibid. at s. 1798.29.
33 Ibid. at ss. 1798.82 to 1798.84.
34 Ibid. at s. 1798.29(e). The definition excludes “publicly available information that is
lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local government
records.” See also s. 1798.29(f).
35 Some other states exempt the requirement for notification not only for encrypted data,
but also where redaction or other methods are used to render the data “unreadable or
unusable”. These states include Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Vermont.
36 See Interagency Guidance, supra note 26 at 15745.
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and dynamic to keep pace with the dynamic world of information technology. In
addition (though the legislation was silent on this), where the security of encrypted
data is breached and the breach also results in the acquisition of the private key for
the encrypted data, such data stands in the same position as unencrypted data,
hence, the requirement of notification under the law should also apply. The New
York data security breach notification law filled this gap by requiring the notifica-
tion of breaches involving encrypted data along with the encryption key.37
In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that Canadian breach notification
legislation should expressly require that notification be made in the following
cases:
1) when there is a breach of encrypted data of which the level of en-
cryption does not provide adequate or sufficient security, judging
from the level or standard of technology in place at the time of the
breach,
2) when there is a breach of encrypted data resulting in the acquisition
of the private key.
Another point to highlight from the California law is that it does not leave it to
the discretion of the data broker or organization involved in security breaches to
determine whether the breach is of such a serious nature as to require notification.
Once the breach relates to unencrypted personal information, there is no discretion
in the matter. Disclosure or notification must be made in the most expeditious time
possible and without unreasonable delay. Delay is only permissible where it is con-
sistent with any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and re-
store the reasonable integrity of the data system, or where it is consistent with the
legitimate needs of law enforcement, e.g. where immediate disclosure or notifica-
tion will jeopardize the activities of law enforcement agents.38
This presents a vicious dilemma. If organizations are required to notify clients
in the event of any security breach of unencrypted data (even where the breach may
not be of a serious nature), it may result in over-notification along with the conse-
quential effects hitherto highlighted. On the other hand, if organizations are given
the leeway to determine which security breach to report or notify clients about,
37 New York, Information Security Breach and Notification Act, 2005 N.Y. LAWS 442,
s. 899-AA, online: Cyber Security&Critical Infrastructure Coordination
<http://www.cscic.state.ny.us/lib/laws/documents/899-aa.pdf> [New York Breach Noti-
fication Act].
38 California Civil Code, supra note 5 at s. 1798.82(a). The current practice in Canada is
for organizations to notify the Office of the Privacy Commissioner when they experi-
ence incidents of security breach to client’s personal information and the Privacy Com-
missioner may then initiate an investigation into the matter. It does not seem that there
is a legal obligation on their part to do this under the PIPEDA. See Office of the Pri-
vacy Commissioner of Canada, News Release, “Privacy Commissioner Launches In-
vestigation of CIBC Breach of Talvest Customers’ Personal Information” (18 January
2007), online: News Release: Privacy Commissioner
<http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2007/nr-c_070118_e.asp>.
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such freedom will not be exercised in the best interest of the clients whose personal
information has been breached. It may also result in outright concealment.
Hence, to deal with the issue of over-notification versus outright or partial
concealment of breach, it is recommended that a typical Canadian data security
breach notification law should require that, in the event of a security breach, the
organization involved should immediately, upon becoming aware of the breach, no-
tify the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (in addition to the law enforcement
agency) who shall, without delay, investigate the nature or seriousness of the
breach to determine if notification should be made.39 The position of the Privacy
Commissioner, as an unbiased third party, will serve to adequately represent the
interest of the organization involved, the clients whose personal information has
been breached, and the public.
An apparent problem with the California legislation is its definition of data
security breach or, to use the exact wording in the legislation, “breach of the secur-
ity of the system.”40 It is defined as “unauthorized acquisition of computerized data
that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information
maintained by the person or business.”41 The use of the word “computerized”
raises a problem with that definition.42 Data is said to be computerized when it
exists in electronic or digital format.43 The definition tends to imply that a data
security breach could only occur when there has been unauthorized acquisition of
personal information existing in digital or electronic format.
The problem with the use of the word “computerized” becomes obvious when
we consider some data spill incidents, such as those in 2001 and 2002, when a
Canadian bank mistakenly faxed documents containing its customers’ personal in-
formation to an unwilling and unauthorized third party.44 In this case, although the
personal information was transferred electronically — by fax — there was no unau-
thorized acquisition until the documents were printed from the recipients’ fax ma-
39 This was also the position adopted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics Considering the 2006 Review of the Per-
sonal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).
40 California Civil Code, supra note 5 at s. 1798.82(d).
41 Ibid. [emphasis added].
42 Connecticut version of the legislation uses the phrase “unauthorized access to or acqui-
sition of electronic files, media, databases or computerized data” [emphasis added].
See U.S., S.B. 650, An Act Requiring Consumer Credit Bureaus To Offer Security
Freezes, 2005, Reg. Sess., C.T. 2005.
43 “Computerized” is defined as “to control, perform, process, or store (a system, opera-
tion, or information) by means of or in an electronic computer or computers.” See Dic-
tionary.com, s.v. “computerized”, online: Dictionary.com
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/computerized>.
44 See Speevak v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Claim No. 05-CV-283484CP,
online: Girard Law Office <http://www.cacounsel.com/
CIBC%20Class%20Action%20Claim.pdf>.
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chine. Thereafter, the documents existed in paper form as opposed to computerized
form.
In another case involving a Canadian collection agency, Nor-Don Collection
Network Inc,45 documents containing debtors’ names and personal information
were recovered from a vacant building. The personal information contained in the
documents included phone numbers, social insurance numbers, addresses, dates of
birth, occupations, bank names, branches, account numbers, account balances, etc;
this information was more than sufficient to perpetrate identity fraud.46
Hence, the use of the word “computerized” in the definition of data security
breach under the California law would imply that situations, like the ones above,
cannot be classified as security breaches simply because the personal information
involved was not in computerized form, even though the same result is generated in
cases of unauthorized acquisition of computerized data. In light of the problem that
may arise from this definition, the State of Indiana Legislature, in enacting its data
security breach notification legislation, opted for a more comprehensive and unam-
biguous definition, viz:
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the secur-
ity, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by a per-
son. The term includes the unauthorized acquisition of computerized data
that have been transferred to another medium, including paper, microfilm,
or a similar medium, even if the transferred data are no longer in a comput-
erized format.47
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that any Canadian data security
breach notification legislation should, for the purpose of clarity and the avoidance
of any ambiguity, adopt a definition styled along the lines of the Indiana legisla-
tion: “an unauthorized acquisition or access to data or documents that compromises
the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by a
person, business or agency”.
With respect to notification, there are three acceptable forms of notification
under the California legislation, namely, a written notice, an electronic notice48 and
45 Alberta, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, Nor-Don Collection
Network Inc. Investigation P2005-IR-002, “Report on an Investigation into the Secur-
ity of Customer Information” by Jill Clayton, Portfolio Officer (31 January 2005), on-
line: Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta
<http://www.oipc.ab.ca/ims/client/upload/P2005_IR_002.pdf>.
46 See also Giordano v. Wachovia Securities LLC et al, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52266 (D.
NJ, 2006) which involved the loss of a printed report containing financial information
of the plaintiffs and tens of other customers of the defendant financial institution.
47 Indiana Code, s. 24-4.9-2-2, online: State of Indiana
<http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title24/ar4.9/ch2.html>.
48 The electronic notice must conform to provisions regarding records and signatures set
forth in s. 7001 of Title 15 of the United States Code, which provides, inter alia, that
where a law requires information relating to a transaction(s) to be in writing, such re-
quirement is satisfied by the use of an electronic record to provide the information if
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a substitute notice.49 Although written notices and electronic notices are the pri-
mary means of notification under the legislation, substitute notices, where permissi-
ble, shall consist of all of the following: an email notice, a conspicuous posting on
the organization’s website (if it has one), and a publication in statewide media.50 It
is necessary to note that the three methods under substitute notice are all cumula-
tive, i.e., the notice must be sent through all the methods (where applicable) and not
either of them.51
A substitute notice is permissible “if the person or business demonstrates that
the cost of providing such notice would exceed two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars ($250,000), or that the affected class of subject persons to be notified ex-
ceeds 500,000, or the person or business does not have sufficient contact informa-
tion.”52 However, the legislation fell short of specifically stating to whom these
facts must be proved or demonstrated before a substitute means of notification
could be authorized. It is suggested that under the Canadian model legislation or
amendment, which is being proposed, the facts should have to be proved to the
federal Privacy Commissioner, who may then authorize the issuance of substitute
notice.
Whatever form the notification takes, the ultimate priority should be to convey
a comprehensive notice to the affected individuals. Such notice should provide de-
tailed information as to the nature and extent of the breach, addressing: the type of
personal information that was involved, the steps the organization has taken since it
discovered the breach, the steps the individuals should take to protect themselves,
and a contact person or persons within the organization to call for further
information.
(ii) Canada
A bold legislative attempt towards notification of breach of personal informa-
tion in Canada, emerged with the enactment of the provincial Personal Health In-
formation Protection Act, 2004 by the Ontario legislature.53 The purpose of the
the consumer has affirmatively consented to receiving the information via electronic
means and has not withdrawn the consent at the time of the information being sent. See
15 U.S.C. s. 7001.
49 Some states, such as Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, among
others, provide for telephonic notice.
50 California Civil Code, supra note 5 at s. 1798.82(g)(3). Provision is also made for
organizations to utilize their own notification procedure where it is in compliance with
the notification requirement under the legislation. See also s. 1798.82(g)(3).
51 The only exception being, where the subject person does not have an email contact or,
where the organization does not own a website.
52 California Civil Code, supra note 5 at s. 1798.29(g)(3).
53 Personal Health and Information protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sched. A., on-
line: Service Ontario e-Laws <http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/
english/elaws_statutes_04p03_e.htm>.
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Act, among others, was to establish rules, for the collection, use and disclosure of
personal health information about individuals, that protect the confidentiality of
that information and the privacy of individuals with respect to that information,
while facilitating the effective provision of health care.54
The Act imposes an obligation on health information custodians, who have
custody or control of personal health information about an individual, to notify the
individual at the first reasonable opportunity if the information is stolen, lost, or
accessed by unauthorized persons.55 For the purpose of clarity, the Act went further
to define personal health information as well as the health information custodian.
Personal health information was defined by the Act to include information about an
individual in oral or recorded form, relating to the physical or mental health of the
individual, and including information that consists of the health history of the indi-
vidual’s family, the provision of health care to the individual, the individual’s eligi-
bility for health care, and health number, among others.56
“Health information custodian” was defined to include persons or organiza-
tions that have custody or control of personal health information as a result of, or in
connection with, the performance of the person’s or organization’s powers or du-
ties.57 This definition would, no doubt, include health care practitioners and provid-
ers, pharmacies, a health or medical laboratory, nursing homes, as well as health
insurance companies, to mention a few.
Although this Act introduced the recommended approach of imposing statu-
tory obligation to raise notification for a data security breach, it suffices to state that
it did not deal with the issue of notification in broad detail. For example, the Act
was silent as to the form which notification should take. There was also a complete
absence of any statutory penalty or remedy for failure to comply with the require-
ment of notification under s. 12 of the Act. In addition, the Act only governs per-
sonal health information and, more so, it is a provincial legislation applicable only
within the province of Ontario. Notwithstanding, the novel move by Ontario toward
statutory imposition of a duty to notify in the event of a breach of data security, is a
step in the right direction. This may as well pave the way for Canadian breach of
data security notification legislation that would fill the current gap created by the
absence of legislation to that effect, as well as the uncertainties in common law
with regard to a duty to notify for data security breaches.
Where there has been a security breach, accompanied by notification to the
individuals involved, in most cases, the usual response on the part of the affected
individuals is to take preventive measures to forestall damages or future harm that
may arise from the use of their personal information. This will normally involve
expenditure in terms of time and monetary resources. In some cases, the victims
may resort to litigation to recover damages for these preventive costs. In the next
54 Ibid. at s. 1.
55 Ibid. at s. 12(1).
56 Ibid. at s. 4(1).
57 Ibid. at s. 3(1).
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part of this article, I shall examine the inadequacy of common law in providing
remedies to victims of data security breaches.
II. COMMON LAW AND DATA SECURITY BREACH
Development in the field of information technology has continued at an un-
precedented speed, bringing with it greater benefits to humanity, as well as expos-
ing us to the risk of injuries. Some of these injuries are novel and, in most cases,
fall outside the scope of legal remedies provided by existing laws.
Information technology is creating “novel” relationships as well as injuries
that are not analogous to any that have come before.58 Some legal jurisdictions
have resorted to the promulgation of statutory laws to provide remedies for victims
of these “novel” injuries, which include data security breaches. In some other juris-
dictions, where such statutory remedies are not yet in place, the recourse for legal
redress has often been founded in antiquated and inadequate common law remedies
such as negligence, breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty, etc.59 This de-
velopment has posed a challenge to existing rules of common law as is rightly ob-
served by Currie:
The common law, with its tradition of conservatism and incremental
change, is confronted with developments that do not lend themselves readily
to the application of precedent and analogy.60
Currie also examines the capacity of the common law tort of negligence to ade-
quately handle “tech torts”. He acknowledges that technological expansion has re-
sulted in new forces producing new relationships, as well as new kinds of injuries,
which need to be compensated. However, he is reluctant to concede the inability of
common law to continue its “mostly proud tradition” of compensating the injured
and providing education and deterrence in relation to tech torts.61 De Villiers also
argues that a victim of a data security breach could litigate, under a negligence
theory, against anyone who contributed to the risk associated with the breach, in-
cluding those who failed in their duty to reduce or eliminate the risk.62
Generally, in an action for negligence in common law, the plaintiff has the
burden of proof. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed him a duty of
care, that the defendant was in breach of the duty, and that the breach of duty re-
58 Robert J Currie, “Of Neighbours and Netizens, or, Duty of Care in the Tech Age: A
Comment on Cooper v. Hobart” (2004) 3:2 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
81 at 83.
59 This research paper focuses on the common law tort of negligence.
60 Currie, supra note 58 at 81.
61 Ibid. at 87.
62 Meiring De Villiers, “Reasonable Foreseeability in the Information Security Law: A
Forensic Analysis” (2008) 30:3 Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law
Journal 419.
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sulted in legal injury to the plaintiff.63 It must also be shown that the defendant’s
act or omission was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.64
When the tort of negligence was enunciated in the famous case of Donoghue
v. Stevenson,65 it was applied with reference to a manufacturer of a drink. Over
time, the tort of negligence was extended to other contexts. Recent attempts to ex-
tend same to cases of data security breaches have been, in most cases, met with
judicial disapproval. Although judicial decisions in this area of information tech-
nology law in Canada are now emerging, I shall examine the judicial approach to
the issue from the United States, where this area of law has received considerable
judicial attention. I shall also examine Canadian tort laws relating to recovery of
damages for economic loss. It is my argument that the economic loss rule in Cana-
dian tort law should undergo further judicial reform to enable recovery for out-of-
pocket expenses resulting from data security breaches.
(a) Proof of Negligence in Data Security Breach Litigation
Data security breaches vary in nature, ranging from the theft or loss of data
tapes or computers,66 the hacking of computer networks and databases, the disposal
of computer systems or mediums containing personal information,67 and the theft
of customer personal information by employees. Other forms include wrongful or
mistaken transfer of clients’ personal information to third parties,68 as well as other
forms of unlawful or unauthorized access to databases containing confidential per-
sonal information.69 Whatever form it takes, a breach of data security could result
in identity theft, credit fraud, or account takeovers. In the latter case, the identity
thief takes over the financial account of the victim.70 Some cases of data security
63 See Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (U.K. H.L.).
64 Derksen v. 539938 Ontario Ltd., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 398 (S.C.C.).
65 Donoghue, supra note 63.
66 Brazos, supra note 30.
67 See e.g. B.C., Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, Investigation Re-
port F06-01, “Sale of Provincial Government Computer Tapes Containing Personal In-
formation” (2006) B.C.I.PC.D. No. 7, online: <http://www.oipc.bc.ca/orders/ investiga-
tion_reports/InvestigationReportF06-01.pdf>.
68 See Speevak, supra note 44.
69 It should be noted that the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has on many
occasions launched investigations into cases of data security breaches, especially those
cases involving breaches of the provisions of the PIPEDA. For comprehensive lists of
these reports, see Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Commissioner’s
Findings: Summaries of Incidents under the Personal Information Protection and Elec-
tronic Documents Act”, online: Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.privcom.gc.ca/incidents/index_e.asp>.
70 If the identity thief opens a new bank or credit account in the victims name, this is
referred to as true name fraud. See Anthony E. White, “The Recognition of a Negli-
gence Cause of Action for Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, Now
Who is Going to Pay for It?” (2005) 88 Marq. L. Rev. 847 at 851.
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breach have been the results of the negligent act of the organizations, or their
agents, in custody of the breached data. For example, in Forbes v. Wells Fargo
Bank,71 a laptop containing unencrypted personal information of the defendant
bank’s customers was negligently left unattended in a rental car, parked at a gas
station with the ignition key switched on, while the defendant bank’s employees
were off to a convenience store located within the gas station. A car thief made
away with the car as well as the laptop. The latter was never recovered.
The security breach in the above case resulted in a class action against the
bank for the negligence of its employees.72 In their complaint, the plaintiffs
claimed they suffered fear, anxiety and worry. Although there was no record of any
fraudulent use of the plaintiffs’ personal information at the time of the proceeding,
the plaintiffs expressed the fear, anxiety and worry as to the possibility of their
becoming victims of identity theft or credit fraud sometime in the future. To fore-
stall this, the plaintiffs expended time and money to monitor their credit for any
fraudulent use of their personal information.
From a layman’s perspective, the conduct of the defendants’ employees in this
case was, no doubt, negligent. However, it suffices to state that in the tort of negli-
gence, merely acting negligently does not give rise to a cause for action. A special
relationship must exist between the parties (at the time of the negligent act) giving
rise to a duty of care, which must have been breached, thus resulting not just in
injury or damage, but rather resulting in the kind of injury or damage recognized by
law.73
Arising from the relationship between a bank and its customer is a responsibil-
ity on the part of the bank to safeguard its clients’ personal information.74 Failure
to do this might give rise to an action for breach of fiduciary duty.75 The customer
has a right to expect that personal information divulged in confidence, in a business
or similar transaction, will be guarded with the utmost care. In addition, looking at
the issue from a control standpoint, the organization in custody of the personal in-
formation is in the best position to protect such information from unauthorized ac-
cess.76 Hence, it is not in dispute that the defendant bank in this case owed the
71 Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F.Supp.2d 1018 (D. Minn., 2006), [Wells
Fargo].
72 In Canada, U.S. and Puerto Rico, a similar class action was commenced in 2007, fol-
lowing breaches of data security at TJX Companies Inc., owners of Winners and
HomeSense. The class action was terminated following an out-of-court settlement
reached between the plaintiffs and TJX Companies. Under the terms of the settlement,
TJX agreed to provide among others for credit monitoring as well as reimbursement for
out-of-pocket costs or personal lost time incurred by affected victims.
73 See Priestman v. Colangelo, [1959] S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.).
74 See Daly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 4 Misc. 3d 887, 782 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (N.Y.
Sup., 2004).
75 See Jones v. Commerce Bank, 06 Civ. 835 (U.S. Dist. 2007) [RNF].
76 Bell v. Michigan Council 25, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 353 (Mich. C.A., 2005).
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plaintiffs a legal duty to protect their personal information while in the possession
or custody of the bank.
In the context of negligence, a legal duty has been defined as an obligation
under the law, of a party to conform to a particular standard of conduct towards
another party.77 The standard for ordinary negligence is the traditional standard of
the reasonable man of ordinary prudence.78 Proceeding from this premise, there
should not be much difficulty in asserting that the defendants’ employees, by leav-
ing the said laptop in an unlocked and unattended car, with the ignition key turned
on, acted negligently. Such a negligent act was in breach of the duty of care, which
the defendant bank owed the affected customers.
However, it is curious that the application of the common law tort of negli-
gence to cases of data security breaches is not as easy as presented in the hypothe-
sis above. The difficulty lies in that, considering the nature of data security
breaches,79 the damage resulting from the breach (which is an essential element of
negligence) may not become immediately evident, as the data thief has in his pos-
session a vast stock of personal information. He may not be able to utilize this large
amount of information immediately. This being the case, the only prudent course of
action for victims of data security breaches would be to expend time and money in
running and reviewing their credit checks, setting up credit fraud alerts, obtaining
new credit and debit cards, closing old, and opening new bank accounts, and taking
other precautionary measures to forestall future harm likely to arise from the fraud-
ulent use of such personal information.
This gives rise to some difficult questions, to which the judicial answers will
essentially highlight the adequacy or inadequacy of the common law tort of negli-
gence to cases of data security breaches. First, in an action for negligence arising
from a data security breach, can a victim of the breach recover damages for a threat
of future harm that has not yet crystallized or, in other words, if the plaintiff has not
suffered a present harm, could the possibility of a future harm satisfy the third ele-
ment of the tort of negligence? Secondly, where the plaintiff expends time and re-
sources in taking precautionary measures to prevent the threat of future harm from
arising due to the breach, are such expenditures or damages recoverable in an ac-
tion for negligence arising from the breach? Where the breach results in actual or
immediate damage, how does the plaintiff prove the element of causation — that
the personal information used to perpetrate fraud in his name — was actually ob-
tained from the breach incident and not from other sources? The question relating
to recovery of damages also relates to lost time and opportunities arising from the
breach. To what extent are lost time and opportunities recoverable, if at all?
As I commence to examine these issues in light of decided cases, I must enter
an early caveat to the effect that many of the judicial answers to these questions
77 See Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d
176, 182 (Minn., 1994).
78 Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87 (S.C.C.).
79 Typically, data security breaches usually result in unauthorized access to the personal
information of a large number of persons.
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have been met with the utmost dissatisfaction from many victims of data security
breaches. This dissatisfaction serves to substantiate the need for judicial reform
through case law as well as statutory intervention.
In the Wells Fargo case mentioned earlier,80 the plaintiffs claimed that the
time and money they spent monitoring their credit report suffices to establish the
essential element of damage in an action for negligence. The Court disagreed with
them, holding that a plaintiff can only recover damages for loss of time in terms of
earning capacity or wages. More so, the loss must result from the present injury and
not from anticipation of future injury. Accordingly, the Court ruled that:
the plaintiffs’ injuries are solely the result of a perceived risk of future harm.
Plaintiffs have shown no present injury or reasonably certain future injury to
support damages for any alleged increased risk of harm. For these reasons,
plaintiffs have failed to establish the essential element of damages.81
Here, the court seems to follow the decision in the earlier case of Guin v.
Brazos Higher Education Service Corp. Inc.,82 in which facts were similar to those
in the Wells Fargo case. In Brazos, the defendant corporation kept some of their
customers’ personal information in an unencrypted format in a laptop computer that
was subsequently stolen from an employee’s home during a burglary. The plaintiff,
on being notified of the incident, ordered and reviewed copies of his credit report
from three credit agencies. Although the credit report did not indicate that the
plaintiff’s personal information had been accessed or misappropriated, the plaintiff
still commenced an action for negligence against the defendants, seeking to recover
for out-of-pocket loss, emotional distress, fear and anxiety, as well as consequential
and incidental damages. In refusing the claim, the Court held that the threat of a
future harm, which has not yet crystallized, will not satisfy the damage requirement
in an action for negligence.83 Of all the cases of data security breaches that have
come before the court so far, the court has not considered the risk of future harm as
sufficient damage.84
80 Wells Fargo, supra note 71.
81 Ibid. at 1021.
82 Brazos, supra note 30.
83 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson, 322 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn., 1982); Stollenwerk v.
Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41054, 1 (D. Ariz., 2005);
Randolph et al. v. ING Life Insurance and Annuity Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11523
(D. D.C., 2007).
84 Walters v. DHL Exp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29057 (D. Ill., 2006) (the court was of
the view that such risk amounts to mere speculation as opposed to actual damage);
Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51235 (W.D. Mich.,
2006) (the court characterized the plaintiff’s claim as an action to “to buy peace of
mind, or to help her determine if and when a claim accrues through actual loss”).
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(i) The “Medical Monitoring” Analogy
One of the seemingly insurmountable hurdles in litigation resulting from data
security breaches has always been the courts’ insistence that the threat of future
harm does not justify a cause of action. Chandler has identified this as one of the
basic problems posed for plaintiffs in negligence claims for harms flowing from
breaches of data security.85
To overcome this hurdle, plaintiffs have often attempted to draw a similarity
between their situations and those of plaintiffs in toxic exposure cases. When a
person has been exposed to toxins or harmful substances, or uses a product later
found to have adverse side effects that are likely to result in a health hazard some-
time in the future, some courts have allowed such individuals to recover expenses
for medical monitoring usually undertaken to prevent or check the development of
the future hazard arising from such exposure.86
Hence, the argument is this; if plaintiffs in toxic exposure cases, which are
likely to result in harm to health sometime in the future (but have not actually re-
sulted in any immediate harm), are entitled to recover damages for medical moni-
toring, it should follow that plaintiffs in data security breaches litigation, who are
exposed to the threat of future harm (but have not suffered any immediate harm),
should equally be entitled to recover damages for expenditures incurred in credit
monitoring as well as other expenditures incurred in forestalling future injury likely
to arise from the breach.
Logical as this analogy may seem, it has been rebuffed by the courts. The
position of the Court seems to be that in toxic exposure cases, there is usually direct
evidence to show that there was actual exposure to the harmful substances. This
direct evidence entitles the plaintiff in such cases to recover the cost of medical
monitoring, notwithstanding that the hazard has not yet arisen. However, in cases
of data security breaches, the court seems to have always emphasized the absence
of any direct evidence of exposure of the personal information of the plaintiff. In
Stollenwerk,87 where unidentified persons burgled the defendants’ facility and stole
computer hard drives containing the plaintiffs’ personal information, the Trial
Court was very reluctant to accept the “medical monitoring” analogy on the ground
that there was no evidence of exposure of the plaintiffs personal information. Ac-
cording to the Court,
Plaintiffs have not brought forward evidence that the personal information
on the stolen computers was ever exposed to the thieves involved . . . there
is nothing in the record here to suggest that the data, rather than the hard-
ware on which the data was stored, formed the thieves’ target. Absent evi-
dence that the data was targeted or actually accessed, there is no basis for a
85 Jennifer A. Chandler, “The Epidemic of Lost and Stolen Data: Are Custodians of Data
Liable in Negligence for Breaches of Data Security” Techlaw Magazine 5.1:23 (Janu-
ary 2008) 23.
86 Wilson v. Servier Canada Inc. (2005), 252 D.L.R. (4th) 742 (Ont S.C.J.); additional
reasons at (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6622 (Ont. S.C.J.).
87 Ibid. at 83.
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reasonable jury to determine that sensitive personal information was signifi-
cantly exposed.88
Unfortunately, even where there is evidence that the personal information was
the target of the data thief, and that such personal information was indeed “ex-
posed” or accessed, the court continues to raise the hurdle for the plaintiff by curi-
ously insisting that the plaintiff must go further to prove that the data thief intends
to make unlawful use of the personal information.89 However, it has been argued
that where there is evidence to indicate that the data has been targeted or, even
more compelling, a proportion of the data has been used in identity fraud, the anal-
ogy between medical monitoring and data security breach cases is more
persuasive.90
Other reasons for the courts’ refusal to adopt the “medical monitoring” anal-
ogy to cases of data security breaches are based on public policy, which has been
accepted by the courts (in toxic tort cases) as justifying the departure from the gen-
eral rule that future risk of injury, without more, cannot form the basis for negli-
gence action.91 Hence, the public policy interest in preserving public health, which
may justify an award for “medical monitoring”, may not be sufficiently elastic to
extend to claims for credit monitoring arising from data security breaches.
In cases of toxic exposure or unsafe product liability, the likelihood of devel-
oping a health condition is, to some extent, scientifically ascertainable with a de-
gree of accuracy, and tort law has always insisted on proof of damages, on the
balance of probabilities, as opposed to mere speculation. However, in cases of data
security breaches, there is no scientific means of proving that the breached data will
be used to perpetrate fraud. In fact, available statistics seem to suggest that the
probability that the breached data will be used to perpetrate fraud is quite low.92
88 Ibid. at 5. When this case went on appeal, the appellate court disagreed with this asser-
tion. According to the court, “As a matter of twenty-first century common knowledge
. . . the theft of a computer hard drive certainly can result in an attempt by a thief to
access the contents for purposes of identity fraud, and such an attempt can succeed.”
See Stollenwerk, supra note 83 at 10.
89 Tracy L. Key v. DSW, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69887 (S.D. Ohio, 2006), at p.17;
Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35845 (U.S. Dist., 3007)
[RNF].
90 Jennifer A. Chandler, “Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security” (2008) 23
Banking & Finance Law Review 223.
91 See Stollenwerk, supra note 83; Amfac Distrib. Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 152, 673
P.2d 792, 793-94 (Ariz. App. 1983).
92 Turner, supra note 9 at 5. It should be noted that the reason why this probability is low
is that a single successful act of data security breach by a data thief would usually
involve large amounts of personal information sometimes running into tens of
thousands or millions. The data thief may only succeed in using a meagre quantity of
the personal information at his disposal.
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Although, this does not suggest that the negligent exposure of personal infor-
mation via data security breaches is entirely dissimilar from negligent exposure to a
health hazard via toxins or unsafe products. In fact, there is a great deal of similar-
ity between the two. Whereas exposure to toxins or unsafe products may result in
harm to health, fraud and identity theft resulting from a data security breach may
also result in psychological or emotional distress.93 More so, the Trial Court in
Stollenwerk noted that:
[in] both circumstances the individual may manifest more obvious injury,
such as identity fraud or disease, after some period of time, and in neither
instance is the later manifestation of patent injury guaranteed, although the
certainty with which such a development may be anticipated may be greater
for toxic torts.94
In view of these similarities, the Trial Court in Stollenwerk was of the opinion
that the “medical monitoring” analogy can only be applied to credit monitoring in
data security breaches if the plaintiff could establish, at a minimum, “(1) significant
exposure of sensitive personal information; (2) a significantly increased risk of
identity fraud as a result of that exposure; and (3) the necessity and effectiveness of
credit monitoring in detecting, treating, and/or preventing identity fraud.”95
(b) Proof of Causation
So far, we have dealt with situations of data security breaches in which the
plaintiffs did not suffer any immediate injury or loss, except for emotional and psy-
chological distress and the incurrence of costs associated with taking preventive
measures (which the U.S. courts have consistently maintained will not sustain a
cause of action). Subsequently, to illustrate the hardship of the applicability of
common law rules to data security breach litigation, I shall examine situations in
which the plaintiffs had suffered actual and immediate damage in the form of iden-
tity theft or fraud following the breach incident. It may be surprising to observe that
even in such situations, recovery of damage remains problematic because of the
difficulty in proof of causation. The doctrine of causation requires that the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant’s act or omission was the proximate cause of his
injury — that the act or omission continued “in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause”, thus, resulting in the injury, and
without which the injury would not have occurred.96
The problem with proof of causation in litigation resulting from data security
breaches lies in the fact that, in the ordinary course of events, an individual’s per-
sonal information is hardly in the sole custody of just one organization or company.
Considering the ease of the flow of information between related organizations, or
93 Stollenwerk, supra note 83. However, this may not be the primary injury.
94 Ibid. at 9.
95 Ibid. at 13.
96 Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of America, Inc., 789 P.2d 1040, 1047, 163 Ariz. 539
(Ariz., 1990).
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government agencies and departments, such information may be held by more in-
stitutions than the individual would have originally expected.
Organizations that may likely have custody or possession of an individual’s
personal information at any particular point in time include banks, utility compa-
nies, insurance companies, telephone service providers, health service providers,
government agencies such as the revenue agency, licensing offices, etc. Hence, a
negligent act on the part of any of these organizations may result in an incident of
security breach, involving the plaintiff’s personal information. If the plaintiff sub-
sequently suffers any damage in the form of identity theft or credit fraud as a result
of the breach, the doctrine of causation requires that the plaintiff must prove that
the personal information used in perpetrating the fraud was obtained from no
source other than the defendant. This is particularly difficult to prove because the
personal information could have been obtained from any of the organizations asso-
ciated with the defendant. It is also possible that such information was acquired
from the internet using phishing websites, malicious software or spyware, or
through an unpublicized breach at some other organization.97
Judicial decisions are in unison to the effect that in an action for negligence,
arising from a data security breach and resulting in actual or immediate injury to
the plaintiff, it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to assert that the injury might have
been caused by the defendant’s act or omission. He must go further to prove that
the injury was indeed caused by the act or omission of the defendant. He must
provide sufficient evidence, from which a reasonable jury could conclude, on the
balance of probabilities, that the injury resulted from the act or omission of the
defendant.98 Such evidence could be actual or circumstantial.99 Where circumstan-
tial, it must be strong and cogent to warrant a reasonable inference of causation
from the circumstances.100
In Stollenwerk,101 one of the plaintiffs contended that the personal information
used to open fraudulent credit accounts in his name was identical to the personal
information in the custody of the defendant and, more so, the fraudulent accounts
were opened six weeks after a security breach that arose from a burglary at the
defendant’s facility. The Trial Court described the plaintiff’s assertion as a “logical
fallacy”. The Court was of the view that,
to determine that one event caused another merely because the first pre-
ceded the second is a classic example of post hoc ergo propter hoc (“af-
97 Chandler, supra note 90.
98 Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc., 169 Ariz. 173, 818 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. App.,
1991).
99 Mason v. Arizona Public Service Co., 127 Ariz. 546, 622 P.2d 493, 500 (Ariz. App.,
1980).
100 Fontaine v. British Columbia (Official Administrator), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.).
See also Sunward Corp v. Dun&Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (C.A.10 (Colo.),
1987); Dreijer v. Girod Motor Co., 294 F.2d 549, 554 (C.A., Miss., 1961).
101 Stollenwerk, supra note 83.
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ter this, therefore because of this”), a logical fallacy. . . . [E]vidence that the
burglary preceded the incidents of identity fraud does not allow a reasonable
jury to infer that the burglary caused the incidents of identity fraud. Such a
conclusion would be the result of speculation and conjecture, not a reasona-
ble inference.102
The Court also observed that the plaintiff in question had also provided similar
personal information to individuals and organizations other than the defendants.
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
views of the Trial Court.103 The Appellate Court was of the view that the particular
victim in question produced sufficient evidence, from which a jury could infer a
causal relationship between the theft of the hard drives and the incidents of identity
fraud he suffered following the Tri-West burglary. The victim, according to the
Appeal Court, need not show that the Tri-West burglary was the sole cause of the
identity fraud incidents, only that it was, more likely than not, a “substantial factor
in bringing about the result,” and a factor “without which the injury would not have
occurred.”104
The Appeal Court identified the primary evidence of causation in this case to
include, among others, the fact that, (1) the victim gave Tri-West his personal in-
formation, (2) the identity fraud incidents began six weeks after the hard drives
containing Tri-West’s customers’ personal information were stolen, and (3) the vic-
tim previously had not suffered any such incidents of identity theft.105
(i) The Doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
Although the general rule in common law is that the plaintiff must plead and
prove negligence on the part of the defendant,106 there are exceptions to this rule
wherein the onus of proof is shifted to the defendant. One of the common law doc-
trines, which enable the invocation of this exceptional rule, is the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor.107 The doctrine is to the effect that, where the actual or specific cause
of an accident or injury is unknown, or is within the exclusive knowledge of the
defendant, a court or jury “may in certain circumstances infer negligence merely
102 Ibid. at 20.
103 Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 27164 (U.S. App.,
2007) [Stollenwerk Appeal].
104 Ibid. at 8.
105 Ibid. at 9.
106 See W. Keeton, Prosner and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.:
West Pub. Co., 1984) at 235; J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed. (North
Ryde, N.S.W.: LBC Information Services, 1998) at 45.
107 Allen Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 8th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2006) at 252. Other
examples are found in cases of dangerous products. See Ives v. Clare Brothers Ltd.
(1970), [1971] 1 O.R. 417 (O.S.C.).
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from the happening of an event and the defendant’s relation to it.”108 Such an infer-
ence automatically shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove negligence.
However, before such an inference can be made by the court or jury, the plain-
tiff seeking to invoke the doctrine must satisfy three basic conditions: (1) that the
event is the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, (2)
that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant, (3) that it must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.109
In Jones v. Commerce Bank,110 the plaintiff alleged that her personal informa-
tion was stolen and used to perpetrate a series of frauds in her name, including the
opening of a fraudulent bank account and utility accounts, as well as the fraudulent
withdrawal of money from her account. This caused payments from her account to
return “unpaid” and resulted in damage to her business. The plaintiff asserted that
the personal information used to perpetrate the frauds was in the sole custody of the
bank. She also drew the Court’s attention to a news report describing massive theft
of confidential data that resulted in the arrest of four of the defendant’s employees.
The plaintiff sought to compensate for her lack of evidence of causation by invok-
ing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. Rejecting this move, the Court stated that:
Plaintiff avers, in essence, that [the defendant] must have committed a neg-
ligent breach of duty because the combination of personal information used
to fraudulently attain a check from Plaintiff’s insurance company was only
possessed by Commerce, and no other institutions or entities. However, it
cannot be said that the identity theft here is an event that “ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence,” just as it cannot be gen-
erally said that criminal activity requires some prior negligence to succeed.
The thieves might well have stolen Plaintiff’s information without any neg-
ligence on the part of [the defendant]. Additionally, it does not appear that
the information that allegedly establishes res ipsa loquitor was in the exclu-
sive control of [the defendant].111
The Court was, therefore, of the view that the facts of the case were not sufficient
to warrant the invocation of res ipsa loquitor. As a result, the plaintiff was unable
to avoid the problem posed by the absence of proof of causation. If the court is
right in its assertion that identity fraud, which may result from data security
breaches, is not an event that “ordinarily does not occur in the absence of some-
one’s negligence,” it is doubtful if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can be conve-
niently invoked in an action for data security breach so as to remedy the difficulty
associated with proof of causation.
108 Kambat v. St. Francis Hosp., 89 N.Y.2d 489, 678 N.E.2d 456, 458, 655 N.Y.S.2d 844
(N.Y., 1997).
109 Ibid.; Jackson v. Millar, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 225 at 235; Hellenius v. Lees, [1972] S.C.R.
165 at 172.
110 Jones v. Commerce Bank, 06 Civ. 835, 2007 U.S. Dist. 15543 (S.D. N.Y. 2007) [RNF].
111 Ibid. at 12.
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Although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is now extinct in Canada by virtue
of Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Fontaine v. British Columbia (Official
Administrator),112 it is survived by other legal principles, which shift the burden of
proof to the defendants in appropriate circumstances, or which allow the court to
infer negligence where necessary. Notwithstanding, it is doubtful from the above
analysis of U.S. case law, that the Canadian courts will apply the surviving princi-
ples in litigation arising from security breaches of personal information.
Proof of damage and causation have consistently become difficult obstacles to
successful data security breach litigation. However, the plaintiffs in Bell v.
Michigan Council 25113 were able to overcome this obstacle because of the unusual
peculiarity of their case, which presented good evidence of damage and causation.
In Bell, an employee of the defendant Council was in the habit of taking home
documents containing personal information of the Council’s members. She did this
for the convenience of working from her home. She continued to do so over a long
period with the tacit approval of the defendant Council until the employee’s daugh-
ter unlawfully misappropriated the plaintiffs’ personal information. The plaintiffs
were able to prove damage by presenting evidence to the effect that the data theft
left their collective credit in ruin. There was also evidence of illegal phone services
and goods purchased in the plaintiffs’ names. The jury accepted this evidence as
sufficient proof of damage.
With regard to the element of causation, there was evidence before the Court
that, when the defendants’ employee’s daughter was arrested for her role in the
identity fraud case, a notebook was found in her room, which contained the plain-
tiffs’ personal information. This circumstantial evidence seems to have established
the element of causation in the case. However, it should be noted that this case did
not establish any general rule as to liability in cases of data security breaches. Even
the Court was quick to acknowledge that each case is unique and the determination
of liability must be made only after considering the relevant factors and the circum-
stances of the particular case.
What seems to make Bell different from the other cases, discussed above, are
the circumstances; the other cases did not deal with actual damage resulting from
the breach, or where there was actual damage, there was no evidence of causation.
Bell presents a unique combination of actual damage and causation. This does not
imply that once there is a reported incident of data security breach and the personal
information of the plaintiff (which constitutes part of the breached data) is used to
perpetrate fraud, the plaintiff is automatically entitled to damages. As has been
noted above, the element of causation must also be established.
Consequently, we arrive at the conclusion that the position in the common law
tort of negligence is that, to be successful in an action for data security breach
arising from the negligent act of the defendant, the plaintiff must, inter alia, show
that the breached data or personal information has been used or misappropriated to
the detriment of the plaintiff, thus resulting in immediate harm as opposed to risk of
112 Fontaine, supra note 100.
113 Bell, supra note 76.
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future harm. Failure to prove such use or misappropriation, resulting in damage,
may warrant dismissal of the plaintiff’s case.
This standpoint in common law puts victims of data security breaches in a
very delicate position. For example, if a victim is unable to prove present damage
arising from the use of his personal information in an action for negligence, result-
ing in the dismissal of his case, can he present his case sometime in the future,
when damage can be ascertained from the detrimental use of the stolen data? It
seems that he may not, as the principle of estoppel per res judicata may become
operative. Assuming, for the purpose of argument, that he could, his chances of
success would be minimal, as the passage of time would have made it even more
difficult to establish causation.
Second, the rule also shows that even damages or losses suffered, as a result of
efforts or attempts to forestall future loss likely to result from such a breach, are not
recoverable in an action for negligence arising from that breach. The rule, there-
fore, leaves victims of data security breaches in a delicate legal quandary. In cases
of data security breaches, it is not reasonable to expect an immediate fraudulent use
of the personal information, resulting in damage. The immediate damage that is
reasonably foreseeable will definitely be the financial cost incurred by the victims
in taking preventative measures to forestall future harm from the use of such per-
sonal information.
Since, in almost all cases, the victims are hardly responsible for the breaches,
it will be commonsensical to expect that, in an action for negligence arising from a
breach, the victim should be able to recover out-of-pocket expenses incurred by
taking the necessary preventative measures to forestall future damage.114 Unfortu-
nately, this has not been the case, as such expenditures have been viewed as pure
economic loss. Furthermore, I shall examine the current state of Canadian legal
jurisprudence to show that legal principles established in Canadian case law could
be applied to enable victims of a data security breach to recover some economic
loss and damages resulting from data security breaches.
(c) The Duty of Care and Economic Loss Rule
Duty of care has been described as the analytical starting point for all negli-
gence claims in common law.115 In the famous “neighbourly principle” formulated
by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson, his Lordship stated:
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in
law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be — persons who are so closely
114 Although, in some cases, the organization or company from wherein the breach ema-
nated may undertake the cost of credit monitoring and alert. This, in most cases is done
out of corporate responsibility and image laundering as there is no legal obligation on
their part to undertake such responsibility. U.S. S.B. 2290, An Act Relating to Protec-
tion From Security Breaches, 23rd Legislature, Reg. Sess., Haw., 2006, s. 3(f).
115 Currie, supra note 58 at 81.
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and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in con-
templation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or
omissions which are called in question.116
The duty of care in the context of tort of negligence, according to Lord Akin, is
owed to neighbours — that is, “persons who are so closely and directly affected”
by your acts that you ought reasonably to have them in contemplation. Since 1932,
when the “neighbourly principle” was formulated in Donoghue, lists of judicial de-
cisions across jurisdictions have sought to broaden the tentacles of duty of care.
The courts are currently faced with the somewhat difficult issue of how the tenta-
cles of the “neighbourly principle” or duty of care could be extended to cover the
digital neighbourhood designed and created by modern technology. The guiding
principle, with regard to the extension of duty of care to “novel” situations, was
laid down in the tests formulated in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council.117
The principle was later reformulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Nielsen v.
Kamloops (City)118 and most recently in the case of Cooper v. Hobart.119 The two
prong tests are:
1) is there a sufficiently close relationship between the parties (the [de-
fendant] and the person who has suffered the damage) so that, in the
reasonable contemplation of the [defendant], carelessness on its part
might cause damage to that person? If so,
2) are there any considerations which ought to negate or limit (a) the
scope of the duty and (b) the class of the persons to whom it is owed
or (c) the damage to which a breach of it may give rise to?
(i) Relationship Between the Parties
The first part of the test examines the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant so as to justify the recognition of a prima facie duty of care and, conse-
quently, the imposition of liability on the defendant for the damages caused to the
plaintiff. According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper v. Hobart,120
Defining the relationship may involve looking at expectations, representa-
tions, reliance, and the property or other interests involved. Essentially,
these are factors that allow us to evaluate the closeness of the relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant and to determine whether it is just
and fair having regard to that relationship to impose a duty of care in law
upon the defendant.
This aspect of the test is very important, as it also attempts to address the problem
associated with indeterminate liability or situations where legal responsibility is ex-
tended to strangers. Although in tort law, the factors that may satisfy the require-
116 Donoghue, supra note 63 at 580.
117 Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1977), [1978] A.C. 728 (U.K. H.L.).
118 Nielsen v. Kamloops (City), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) [Kamloops].
119 Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (S.C.C.).
120 Ibid. at para. 34.
A NEW APPROACH TO DATA SECURITY BREACHES   177
ment of proximity are diverse and depend on the circumstances of each case, such
proximity need not be confined to mere physical proximity. On the contrary, it
“extends to such close and direct relations that the act complained of directly af-
fects a person whom the person alleged to be bound to take care would know would
be directly affected by his careless act.”121
In cases of data security breaches, there is sufficiently close relationship be-
tween the plaintiff (the victim) and the defendant (data possessor). This relationship
arises when the data possessor comes into possession of the plaintiff’s personal
information, which must have been requested for and/or obtained in the usual
course of a business transaction between the parties.122 It is this close relationship
between the parties that results in the defendant’s creation of a database that con-
tains, among others, the plaintiff’s personal information.
(ii) Considerations to Negate or Limit
The second aspect of the test deals with considerations which might negate or
limit the scope of the duty, the class of persons to whom it is owed, or the damage
to which the breach may give rise to. Such considerations may include, among
others, the availability of contract terms or insurance to cover the claim. One of the
policy reasons for denial of recovery for pure economic loss is the need to preserve
the boundary line between contract and tort, which will be discussed later. Implic-
itly, the courts may insist that out-of-pocket expenditures, incurred as a result of a
data security breach, are only recoverable under a contract and not in tort. Such
reasoning will require individuals to negotiate the level of data security and liability
121 Donoghue, supra note 63 at 580-81. See also La Forest J in Hercules Managements
Ltd. v. Ernst&Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165 (S.C.C.), at para. 24; Wherein he said “[t]he
label ‘proximity’, as it was used by Lord Wilberforce in Anns, was clearly intended to
connote that the circumstances of the relationship inhering between the plaintiff and the
defendant are of such a nature that the defendant may be said to be under an obligation
to be mindful of the plaintiff’s legitimate interests in conducting his or her affairs.”
122 This argument may be somewhat different where the defendant is a data broker who
trades on the personal information even without any business transaction or relation-
ship with the data breach victim. Although the relationship, in this case, might not be as
close as the one analyzed above, there still exists sufficient proximity to justify the
imposition of a prima facie duty of care on the defendant. Proximity in this case will
arise (even in the absence of direct relationship between the parties) where the defen-
dant in the course of his transaction reasonably foresees that negligence on his part
might result in damage to the plaintiff. See Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk
Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021 at 1114-1115 (S.C.C.); reconsideration
refused (July 23, 1992), Doc. 21838 (S.C.C.) [Norsk]. See also Deane J. in Sutherland
Shire Council v. Heyman (1985), 60 A.L.R. 1 at 55-56 (Australia, H.C.). Hence, in this
exceptional situation where the defendant profits at the risks of exposing the plaintiff’s
personal information to unscrupulous third parties, it will not be in the interest of pub-
lic policy to exonerate the defendant data broker from liability for his data spill. In fact,
public interest is best served by holding him accountable.
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for the breach of personal information when entering into contracts, with compa-
nies or organizations, which warrant the transfer of their personal information. On
the other hand, it will also imply that the companies could include, in such con-
tracts, terms that absolve them of any liability for security breaches.
Considering the unequal bargaining power between the two parties, we will
witness a proliferation of contractual terms phrased more in favour of absolving
companies of their liability for security breaches than those in favour of individual
customers.123 This will be contrary to public policy. In view of this, some legal
jurisdictions have passed data security breaches laws, which contain, among others,
provisions outlining that a waiver of the rights granted to the data possessor is con-
trary to public policy.124 From the analysis so far, it is safe to conclude that the
availability of contract terms, through which the parties may be able to allocate
liabilities in the event of data breaches, does not justify the negation or limitation of
the liability of a data possessor for his negligence, which results in a data spill. But,
what about insurance policies?
Typically non-existent or unknown a few years ago, identity theft insurance
has become a common product in the insurance market. The policy is designed to
cover out-of-pocket expenses associated with reclaiming identity in the event of
identity theft.125 Should the availability and affordability of the policy serve as a
factor to negate or limit liability under the Anns test? The answer to this question
will require important policy considerations. First, it should be noted that identity
theft insurance is offered by the same organizations (or their subsidiaries) that have
become notorious for negligently mishandling their customers’ personal informa-
tion.126 Conspiracy theorists will be quick to conceive the policy as nothing more
than a ploy, by these organizations, to shift the burden of their prospective negli-
gence to their customers.
Although identity theft insurance policies have the tendency of providing indi-
viduals with “peace of mind,” their proliferation will result in a diminished sense of
responsibility and security on the part of both individuals as well as data posses-
123 Most companies, in this regard, will often employ standard form contracts, which they
unilaterally draft. The data subject usually has no opportunity to make any input or
negotiate any term.
124 See U.S. S.B. 6191, An Act Relating to Identity Theft Protection, 2005 General Assem-
bly, Reg. Sess., R.I., 2005, 2. 11-49.29.
125 The cost of this policy could range from $20 to $100 a year. See Herb Weisbaum,
“Why ID Theft Insurance Might Not Be Worth It” msnbc, online: msnbc
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12692565/>.
126 Such organizations include banks and credit card companies. See About.com, “Should
You Buy Identity Theft Insurance or Credit Monitoring Services? Necessary Coverage
or False Sense of Security?” online: About.com Financial Planning
<http://financialplan.about.com/od/insurance/a/IDTheftInsure.htm>.
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sors.127 This will have the tendency to provide a virile atmosphere for data theft to
thrive in. Rather than an aftermath compensation that has the tendency to nourish
the crime of data theft, a proactive measure that will compel data possessors to take
adequate measures to forestall data breaches is vital. If data possessors are held
liable for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by data breach victims, the number of
which may run into tens or hundreds of thousands, data possessors will be more
responsible in their handling of clients’ personal information. On the other hand, if
they know that their negligent acts will be covered by some insurance policy, the
cost of which has already been borne by the victims, or prospective victims, the
opposite will be the case.
The current boom in identity theft insurance policies, prompted out of a desire
to buy peace of mind, ought not to serve as a consideration to negate or limit the
scope of the duty of data possessors or their liability for out-of-pocket expenditures
incurred by the victim as a result of the breach. If the availability of such insurance
policies is to serve as a mitigating factor, then the cost for the provision of the
policies should be imposed on, or borne by the data possessors.
The economic loss rule is a common law rule that effectively states that a
plaintiff in an action for negligence may recover damages for pure economic loss
only when there is an accompanying damage to his person or property. Hence, in
cases where the negligent act of the defendant results only in pure economic loss
without more, the court has often denied recovery.128 Pure economic loss differs
from consequential economic loss; whereas consequential economic loss is a finan-
cial loss connected to physical damage to the plaintiff’s person or property, pure
economic loss is a financial loss suffered by the plaintiff without any physical in-
jury to his person or property.129
The economic loss rule seems to have been founded on public policy consider-
ations. Johnson has identified three policy reasons behind the rule.130 The first is
the avoidance of too broad a scope of liability or unlimited liability. Some negli-
gent conduct could have broad economic implications. For example, the negligent
act of a drunk driver, who causes an auto accident on a busy highway, could have a
broad economic impact on a large number of people, including the careful driver
whose car was directly impacted, other drivers who may have to take another
(longer) route due to traffic diversion, and the fish monger in the nearby city who
127 See Laura Bruce, “Is Identity Theft Protection Worth the Money?” Bankrate.com, on-
line: Bankrate.com
<http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/advice/scams/20040804a2.asp>.
128 Ann O’Brien, “Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood of Litigation for
Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss” (1989) 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 959.
129 See Linden, supra note 107 at 441.
130 Vincent R. Johnson, “Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability”
(19 August 2005) bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 713 at 45, online: bepress Le-
gal Repository
<http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3530&context=expresso>.
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relies on the free-flow of traffic on this road for the timely delivery of his merchan-
dise. It will not be sensible to hold the negligent driver liable for all the economic
loss incurred by persons held-up in traffic as a result of the auto accident, neither
will it be sensible to hold him liable for loss of profit incurred by some unknown
fish monger whose delivery was delayed as a result of the auto crash. The eco-
nomic loss rule serves to protect prospective defendants from indeterminate liabil-
ity, or too wide a scope of liability, by curbing the proliferation of litigation arising
from negligently inflicted pure economic loss.
The second reason identified behind the economic loss rule is the fact that lost
opportunities are not often readily susceptible to precise calculation. Recovery of
damages in law (where a cause of action has been established) generally requires
proof of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty. The economic loss rule,
therefore, endeavours to ensure that compensation is not awarded for amounts that
are purely speculative or uncertain. Third and most important, is the rule that marks
the boundary between contract law and tort law. This demarcation is important be-
cause, without it, contract law stands the risk of “drown[ing] in a sea of tort”.131
The need for this demarcation was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Martel Building Ltd. v. R.,132 where the Court refused to allow recovery of dam-
ages for pure economic loss arising from a breach of duty of care in the course of
contractual negotiation.
Although the common law usually refuses recovery for economic loss unac-
companied by any consequential loss, the Supreme Court of Canada, based on the
works of Bruce Feldthusen,133 now recognizes five categories of compensational
pure economic loss.134 However, this does not imply that the categories of recover-
able economic loss are now closed.135 Nevertheless, before a new category can be
created or recognized, the court will most likely embark on an extensive analysis of
the policy considerations to satisfy itself of the necessity for such extension.136
Taking account of these policy considerations, it is necessary to examine whether a
new category should be added to the existing five recognized categories so as to
allow for recovery of economic loss damages arising from data security breaches.
131 See Hood J. in Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v. Ameron International Corp., 2006 NSSC
332 (N.S. S.C.); affirmed (2007), 2007 CarswellNS 257 (N.S. C.A.); leave to appeal
refused (2008), 2008 CarswellNS 13 (S.C.C.) citing Blackmun J. in East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delavel Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (U.S. Sup., Ct.), at 866 (1986).
132 Martel Building Ltd. v. R. (2000), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.) [Martel Building].
133 Bruce Feldthusen, Economic Negligence: the Recovery of Pure Economic Loss, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989).
134 See Norsk, supra note 122.
135 Attempts were made (though without success) to create a new category in Martel
Building, supra note 132 and Status Electrical Corp. v. University of British Columbia
(2006), 6 C.L.R. (3d) 85 (B.C. S.C.) [RNF].
136 See Harry Street, The Law of Torts, 6th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1976) at 108. Cit-
ing a Canadian case, Nova Mink Ltd. v. Trans-Canada Airlines, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 241
(N.S. C.A.) at 254.
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The first step in this direction would require identification and analysis of the type
of economic loss that usually results from data security breaches.
(iii) Economic Loss Arising from Data Security Breaches
Unauthorized use of personal information usually results in harm or loss to the
victim. Where the harm is in the nature of bad credit reputation, the victim will
normally incur out-of-pocket expenses to restore his good credit standing.137 In
some cases, where the data thief has perpetrated a crime in the name of the victim
that results in the victim being arrested and wrongly prosecuted for the crime, there
may be an additional legal cost incurred by the victim in defending the mistaken
prosecution. The second loss likely to arise from unauthorized use of personal in-
formation is the personal time spent in trying to restore lost good credit standing.
The third is the lost opportunities resulting from bad credit.138 Admittedly, recov-
ery for such loss is not possible under the existing five categories earlier high-
lighted. Nevertheless, it has been noted that the category is not closed; this calls for
examination of the possibility for the creation of a new category of recoverable
economic loss in light of the policy consideration that restricts recoverability for
pure economic loss.
The first reason for the restriction of recovery for pure economic loss, as ear-
lier stated, is formulated on the need to avoid too broad a scope of liability or inde-
terminate liability. Since the number of people likely to be affected by the defen-
dant’s act may be too broad, in the absence of this rule, the potential liability would
be excessive and uncontrollable. Granted, the nature of data security breaches are
such that they may result in a very broad liability and a single breach incident could
affect the personal information of tens of thousands or millions of people, thus re-
sulting in myriads of litigation across jurisdictions. However, this is one area where
the policy consideration relating to scope of liability should be carefully revisited.
It should be the responsibility of the defendant to restrict the scope of his liability
by restricting the amount of personal information he accumulates in his
database.139 Where a data possessor profits by keeping a large database, it will not
137 This out-of-pocket expense could include the cost of credit monitoring services, closing
and re-opening banks and credit accounts, costs of re-issuing credit and debit cards,
telephone and postage costs etc.
138 Johnson, supra note 130.
139 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has acknowledged in its report that
“Collecting and retaining excessive personal information creates an unnecessary secur-
ity burden. Thus, organizations should collect only the minimum amount of informa-
tion necessary for the stated purposes and retain it only for as long as necessary, while
keeping it secure.” See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Report of an
Investigation into the Security, Collection and Retention of Personal Information: TJX
Companies Inc./Winners Merchant International L.P.” (25 September 2007), online:
Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/cf-
dc/2007/TJX_rep_070925_e.asp>.
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be in the interest of public policy to shield him from the greater responsibility that
comes with such a venture by denying a large number of victims recovery for eco-
nomic loss inflicted on them by a negligent defendant data possessor. The law re-
lating to the restriction of liability should be confined to cases where the defendant
has no reasonable opportunity of limiting the number of prospective plaintiffs, and
not to cases that deal with data security breaches where the defendant has such
opportunity and, not only fails to utilise it, but even profits financially from not
doing so.
The second reason for the policy is the fact that lost opportunities are not often
readily susceptible to precise calculation; hence, litigation relating to pure eco-
nomic loss is usually speculative in nature. It is conceded that some economic loss
damages arising from data security breaches are speculative. Speculative damage
will, no doubt, include personal time spent in trying to restore good credit ratings
and lost opportunities arising from bad credit.140 If the court were to allow victims
of data spills to recover for the time spent in trying to restore their good credit and
lost opportunities, this would be the height of compensation for speculative dam-
age. Among the problems that will arise, according to Johnson,141 will be the prob-
lem of how to quantify the economic value of lost time and opportunities:
If plaintiff’s time were compensated at his or her usual hourly rate of earn-
ings in employment or a profession, the awards made to professionals, mini-
mum-wage workers, and unemployed homemakers would vary widely-and
perhaps without good reason. Similarly, if every victim were to receive the
same amount for the value of lost time, how would that amount be set?
Ensuring uniformity with respect to this element of damages is a task better
committed to legislatures than to the multitude of fact finders who will pre-
side over numerous tort claims.
The problem with regard to lost opportunity is related to the legal principle
that requires that damages must be proved before recovery. How does the plaintiff
prove that opportunities were actually lost? Even where the lost opportunity is
proved, how do we quantify it in terms of monetary value? For example, if the
plaintiff is able to prove that, because of his ruined credit he was unable to obtain a
mortgage, what yardstick do we adopt in trying to quantify this lost opportunity?
Most assertions in this regard would, at best, be speculative. Hence, it can be
rightly asserted that economic loss arising from lost time and opportunity as a result
of data security breaches cannot pass the public policy test for recovery. However,
this argument may not hold with regard to out-of-pocket expenses incurred to re-
store a good credit rating. In the case of out-of-pocket expenses, the claims are not
speculative. They could be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty; the re-
ceipts for the expenses incurred are usually available for inspection. More so, the
140 According to a legislative analysis, victims of data security breaches spend an average
of 600 hours and over two to four years and about $1,400 to clear their names. See
Texas Bill Analysis, 2005 Reg. Sess. Sen. Bill 122, online: Texas Legislature
<http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79R/analysis/pdf/SB00122F.pdf>.
141 Johnson, supra note 130 at 50.
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expenses under this head are strictly in monetary terms, hence, there is no problem
(as in the earlier situation) as to how to quantify the loss.
The analysis above has sought to establish that the relationship between the
victim of a data breach and the negligent data possessor is such that warrants the
extension of the duty of care. Since the breach of this duty naturally results in eco-
nomic loss, it does not offend any public policy to allow victims of data security
breaches to recover economic loss damages in the form of out-of-pocket expenses
incurred as a result of data security breaches arising from the defendant’s
negligence.
III. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
Legal remedies for data security breaches present a novel legal problem in
information technology law. The main barrier to seeking remedy in the tort of neg-
ligence arises from the problems associated with proof of damages, and causation
and recovery for economic loss, among others. Notwithstanding its historical effi-
cacy in compensating the injured, the ability of the common law tort of negligence
to deal with tech torts gives more room for doubt than certainty. Chandler has ob-
served that,
Tort law has been used in the past to cause careless actors to bear the cost of
their own carelessness in order to encourage a reasonable level of care to be
taken. Unfortunately, the court have so far found negligence law to be
poorly-equipped to deal with the problem.142
The growth in information technology will necessitate that individuals must con-
tinue to entrust their personal information to companies, organizations and institu-
tions with the inevitable incidents of data security breaches. Although PIPEDA im-
posed an obligation on organizations to provide security safeguards for personal
information in their custody, the same law falls short of providing adequate legal
redress for victims of data security breaches arising from the negligent act of such
companies, organizations and institutions. The current position of the Act, to say
the least, is not of much assistance to victims of a data security breaches in an
action for negligence.143
Hence, the lacuna in common law necessitates comprehensive and dynamic
legislation to deal with the current difficulties experienced by victims of data secur-
ity breaches in maintaining actions for negligence. Such legislation should require
that, in cases of data security breaches, companies and organizations responsible
for the custody of the breached data should bear the responsibility and the cost for
142 Chandler, supra note 85 at 25.
143 The victim may only file a complaint with the Privacy Commissioner in accordance
with s. 11 of the Act and within 45 days after receiving the Commissioner’s report, the
victim may apply to the court for a hearing in respect of the subject matter of the
complaint. See PIPEDA, supra note 2 at s. 14.
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taking preventive measures to protect the victims of the breach from present and
future risk of damage resulting from the breach. This includes notifying the victims
of the breach and consumer monitoring agencies,144 providing credit-monitoring
services and, if necessary, credit-repair services on behalf of all victims of such a
breach.145 Where it becomes imperative for the victim to take the necessary pre-
ventive measure, he should be able to recover costs or expenses from the responsi-
ble organization.
This measure, no doubt, will go a long way in addressing the difficulties cur-
rently experienced by victims of data security breaches, for which existing law does
not provide a remedy. It will also compel data brokers and organizations, dealing
with customers’ personal information, to take adequate steps to protect confidential
data in their custody. Consumers should not have to bargain with companies over
their right to have their personal information kept safe. This ought to be considered
a necessary part of doing business when a company seeks confidential customer
data as part of its business model.146
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have examined the need for judicial reform as well as legisla-
tive intervention in two areas of data security breaches. The first is the need for the
statutory imposition of a duty to notify affected individuals in the event of a data
spill. Admittedly, a blanket requirement to that effect may result in over-notifica-
tion. However, it is suggested that the problem of over-notification could be ad-
dressed by requiring security breaches to be communicated to the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner, who should immediately assess the incident to determine
whether notification ought to be made, and in what form.
Secondly, I have highlighted the inadequacies or difficulties in the applicabil-
ity of existing common law rules in data security breaches litigation. This problem
constitutes to be a major setback to victims of data security breaches who are seek-
ing legal redress. There is, therefore, a need for judicial reform and/or statutory
intervention in this area to deal with the uncertainties in the application of common
law rules to data security breaches litigation.
Finally, there is an emerging legal issue relating to breach of data security not
covered in this research article, which warrants further research. The issue became
evident in the litigations that trailed the breach incidents involving TJX Stores.147
144 This is a legal obligation under the Hawaiian Security Breach Notification Act at s.
3(f), online: Hawaiian State Legislature <http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/
session2006/Bills/SB2290_.htm>.
145 Anita Ramasastry “Data Insecurity: What Remedy Should Consumers Have When
Companies Do Not Keep Their Data Safe?” FindLaw (6 March 2006), online: FindLaw
<http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20060306.html>.
146 Ibid.
147 In January 2007, TJX Companies, a large retailer that operates over 2,000 retail stores,
mainly in the Unites States, Canada and Puerto Rico, reported that it suffered a massive
computer breach on a portion of its network that handles credit card, debit card,
cheque, and merchandise transactions. The incident resulted in class action lawsuits,
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A breach incident may take the form of hacking of a merchant’s database, usually
resulting in the compromise of credit or debit card information. In addition to the
financial loss that may be experienced by financial institutions as a result of fraudu-
lent transactions associated with the breach, they may also incur financial costs in
their effort to protect their customers or cardholders. Such efforts could include the
cancellation and re-issuing of new cards to affected customers. Could the banks and
credit card companies successfully maintain a legal action against the negligent
merchant for the purpose of recovering the costs incurred in the cancellation and re-
issuing of such cards? Alternatively, will the court accept a defence argument to the
effect that the costs were “solely the result of a perceived risk of future harm” as
opposed to “present injury or reasonably certain future injury”?148 This issue was
likely to arise for determination in the litigations filed by various banks in the
United States against TJX. However, it is becoming evident that the litigations may
all end in an out-of-court settlement, thus leaving the issue unresolved.149
not just by affected customers, but also by banks and credit card companies who in-
curred costs in cancelling and re-issuing millions of cards to affected customers.
148 Wells Fargo, supra note 71.
149 See M.H. Bosworth, “TJX Settles With Banks Over Data Breaches” Consumer Affairs
(20 December 2007), online: Consumer Affairs <http://www.consumeraffairs.com/
news04/2007/12/tjx_banks.html>.
